I was thinking about this yesterday but got my thread closed as it was in a different part of these forums, either way. The Xbox live communication uses i think the DES encryption algorithm, if its somehow decrypted the rest wouldn't be THAT hard.
The Kerberos model does, however, have certain weaknesses:
* In Kerberos IV (the version of Kerberos used by AFS and Zephyr) all encryption is performed using the DES algorithm. While DES was considered "unbreakable" at the time of the release of Kerberos IV, it is now believed that a sufficiently motivated miscreant could, with only modest computing resources, conceivably crack DES encryption in a relatively short period of time. Some researchers have, in fact, been able to do just that under certain specific circumstances. Since the trustability of Kerberos authentication depends entirely on unbreakability of the underlying encryption technology used by the system, this poses a threat to the security of Kerberos IV. In the current release of Kerberos, Kerberos V, support is provided for "plug-in" symmetric encryption algorithms. Kerberos V systems can use, for example, the much more secure triple-DES or IDEA encryption algorithms. The overall structure of Kerberos V remains the same as that of Kerberos IV. Webauth, for example, used 3DES keys to secure services (more on Webauth later... :-).
* Kerberos was designed for use with single-user client systems. In the more general case, where a client system may itself be a multi-user system, the Kerberos authentication scheme can fall prey to a variety of ticket-stealing and replay attacks. The overall security of multi-user Kerberos client systems (filesystem security, memory protection, etc.) is therefore a limiting factor in the security of Kerberos authentication. No amount of cleverness in the implementation of a Kerberos authentication system can replace good system administration practices on Kerberos client and server machines.
* Because Kerberos uses a mutual authentication model, it is necessary for both client machines and service providers (servers) to be designed with Kerberos authentication in mind. Many proprietary applications already provide support for Kerberos or will be providing Kerberos support in the near future. Some legacy systems and many locally-written and maintained packages, however, were not designed with any third-party authentication mechanism in mind, and would have to be re-written (possibly extensively) to support Kerberos authentication.
* The Kerberos authentication model is vulnerable to brute-force attacks against the KDC (the initial ticketing service and the ticket-granting service). The entire authentication system depends on the trustability of the KDC(s), so anyone who can compromise system security on a KDC system can theoretically compromise the authentication of all users of systems depending on the KDC. Again, no amount of cleverness in the design of the Kerberos system can take the place of solid system administration practices employed in managing the Kerberos KDC(s).
This post has been edited by Datenshiz: Dec 7 2009, 02:36 PM